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This paper examines the long term profile of fiscal deficit and
debt relative to GDP in India, with a view to analysing debt-deficit
sustainability issues along with the considerations relevant for
determining suitable medium and short-term fiscal policy stance. The
impact of debt and fiscal deficit on growth and interest rates that arises
from their effect on saving and investment are critical in any examination
of sustainability of debt and deficit. It is argued that large structural
primary deficits and interest payments relative to GDP have had an
adverse effect on growth in recent years. The Fiscal Responsibility and
Budget management Act (FRBMA) of the central government has certain
positive features. While the fiscal deficit target has been defined, it
should be considered in conjunction with a target debt-GDP ratio.
Further, the central FRBMA should be supplemented by state level fiscal
responsibility legislations and an effective hard budget constraint on sub-
national borrowing. There is a clear need to bring down the combined
debt-GDP ratio from its current level, which is in excess of 80 percent of
GDP. The process of adjustment can be considered in two phases:
adjustment phase and stabilisation   phase.    In   the   adjustment phase, 
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fiscal deficit should be reduced in each successive year until revenue
deficit, and correspondingly, government dissaving, is eliminated. In the
second phase, fiscal deficit could be stabilised at 6 percent of GDP. The
debt-GDP ratio would eventually stabilise at 56 percent. In this process,
the ratio of interest payments to revenue receipts will fall, enabling a
progressively larger amount of primary revenue expenditure to be
incurred on the social sectors.
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Fiscal Deficits and Government
Debt in India: Implications for
Growth and Stabilisation
Fiscal deficits are like obesity. You can see your weight rising on
the scale and your clothing size increasing, but there is no sense of
urgency in dealing with the problem.
                                                                              Martin Feldstein 
Address to Reserve Bank of India, January 12, 2004
Introduction
 High levels of fiscal deficit relative to GDP tend not only to
cause sharp increases in the debt-GDP ratio, but also adversely affect
savings and investment, and consequently growth. The usability of fiscal
policy as a tool of countercyclical intervention is also compromised when
fiscal deficit is high and structural in nature. This paper examines the
long term profile of fiscal deficits in India, its impact on growth that arises
from its impact on savings and investment, which may occur directly or
through its effects on interest rates and inflation. It also looks at relevant
considerations for determining levels of debt and deficit relative to GDP
at which these should be stabilised in India, given the current
configuration of key determinants like the revenue to GDP ratio and
public and private saving rates consistent with the objective of achieving
higher growth.
The combined fiscal deficit of the centre and states stood at 9.3
percent of GDP in 1990-91. There was a clear improvement in the early
nineties. After falling to 6.26 percent in 1996-97, the fiscal deficit to GDP
ratio started rising again and was around 10 percent in 2001-02 and
2002-03. Although only marginally higher than that in 1990-91, this level
of fiscal deficit was qualitatively much different because it was
accompanied by much higher levels of the debt-GDP ratio, the ratio of
interest payments to revenue receipts, and the share of revenue deficit in6
fiscal deficit. The debt-GDP ratio has risen from 61.7 percent in 1990-91
to about 76 percent in 2002-03, when external debt is considered at
historical exchange rates and liabilities of states on account of reserve
funds and deposits are not included. When these are included and
external debt is evaluated at current exchange rates an upward
adjustment of about 9 percentage points of GDP is called for, consisting
of 3 and 6 percentage points for the two factors, respectively, taking
government liabilities to about 85 percent of GDP at the end of 2002-03. 
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 gives a
summary of the theoretical perspectives that provide an insight into ways
in which fiscal deficits can affect some of the important macro variables
of the economy. Section 3 summarises the main issues in the Indian
context. Section 4 looks at the conditions of sustainability of fiscal deficits
and its relationship with growth, primary deficits and interest rate in the
context of the dynamics of debt accumulation and examines the growth
of the debt-GDP ratio in India in a long term perspective. Section 5 looks
at the saving and investment performance in India and empirically
investigates certain critical relationships describing the impact of fiscal
deficit on saving and investment that have a bearing on the growth
prospects in India. Section 6 distinguishes between structural and
cyclical deficits and the role of discretionary policy for macroeconomic
stabilisation. Section 7 provides concluding observations.
II. Theoretical Perspectives
There is no agreement among economists either on analytical
grounds or on the basis of empirical results whether financing
government expenditure by incurring a fiscal deficit is good, bad, or
neutral in terms of its real effects, particularly on investment and growth.
Among the mainstream analytical perspectives, the neo-classical view
considers fiscal deficits detrimental to investment and growth, while in
the Keynesian paradigm, it constitutes a key policy prescription.
Theorists persuaded by Ricardian equivalence assert that fiscal deficits
do not really matter except for smoothening the adjustment to
expenditure or revenue shocks. While the neo-classical and Ricardian
schools focus on the long run, the Keynesian view emphasises the short
run effects.7
The Neo-Classical View
The component of revenue deficit in fiscal deficits implies a
reduction in government saving or an increase in government dis-saving.
In the neoclassical perspective (see, e.g. Bernheim, 1989), this will have
a detrimental effect on growth if the reduction in government saving is
not fully offset by a rise in private saving, thereby resulting in a fall in the
overall saving rate. This, apart from putting pressure on the interest rate,
will adversely affect growth. The neo-classical economists assume that
markets clear so that full employment of resources is attained. In this
paradigm, fiscal deficits raise lifetime consumption by shifting taxes to
the future generations. If economic resources are fully employed,
increased consumption necessarily implies decreased savings in a
closed economy. In an open economy, real interest rates and investment
may remain unaffected, but the fall in national saving is financed by
higher external borrowing accompanied by an appreciation of the
domestic currency and fall in exports. In both cases, net national saving
falls and consumption rises accompanied by some combination of fall in
investment and exports. The neo-classical paradigm assumes that the
consumption of each individual is determined as the solution to an inter-
temporal optimisation problem where both borrowing and lending are
permitted at the market rate of interest. It also assumes that individuals
have finite life spans where each consumer belongs to a specific
generation and the life spans of successive generations overlap.
Citing recent evidence in the US context, Gale and Orszag
(2002), observe that a reasonable estimate is that a reduction in the
projected budget surplus (or increase in the projected budget deficit) of
one percent of GDP will raise long-term interest rates by 50 to 100 basis
points. In their view, fiscal discipline promotes long-term growth primarily
because budget surpluses are a form of national saving. 
Keynesian View of Fiscal Deficits
The Keynesian view (see, e.g., Eisner, 1989), in the context of
the existence of some unemployed resources, envisages that an
increase in autonomous government expenditure, whether investment or
consumption, financed by borrowing would cause output to expand
through a multiplier process. The traditional Keynesian framework does
not distinguish between alternative uses of the fiscal deficit as between
government consumption or investment expenditure, nor does it8
distinguish between alternative sources of financing the fiscal deficit
through monetisation or external or internal borrowing. In fact, there is no
explicit budget constraint in the analysis. Subsequent elaborations of the
Keynesian paradigm envisage that the multiplier-based expansion of
output leads to a rise in the demand for money, and if money supply is
fixed and deficit is bond financed, interest rates would rise partially
offsetting the multiplier effect. However, the Keynesians argue that
increased aggregate demand enhances the profitability of private
investment and leads to higher investment at any given rate of interest.
The effect of a rise in interest rate may thus be more than neutralised by
the increased profitability of investment. Keynesians argue that deficits
may stimulate savings and investment even if interest rate rises,
primarily because of the employment of hitherto unutilised resources.
However, at full employment, deficits would lead to crowding out even in
the Keynesian paradigm. In the standard Keynesian analysis, if every
one thinks that a budget deficit makes them wealthier, it would raise the
output and employment, and thereby actually make people wealthier.
Unlike the loanable funds theory, the Keynesian paradigm rules out any
direct effect on interest rate of borrowing by the government.
Ricardian Equivalence Perspective
In the perspective of Ricardian equivalence (e.g. Barro, 1974,
1976, 1979, 1987, 1989), fiscal deficits are viewed as neutral in terms of
their impact on growth. The financing of budgets by deficits amounts only
to postponement of taxes. The deficit in any current period is exactly
equal to the present value of future taxation that is required to pay off the
increment to debt resulting from the deficit. In other words, government
spending must be paid for, whether now or later, and the present value
of spending must be equal to the present value of tax and non-tax
revenues. Fiscal deficits are a useful device for smoothening the impact
of revenue shocks or for meeting the requirements of lumpy
expenditures, the financing of which through taxes may be spread over a
period of time. However, such fiscal deficits do not have an impact on
aggregate demand if household spending decisions are based on the
present value of their incomes that takes into account the present value
of their future tax liabilities. Alternatively, a decrease in current
government saving that is implied by the fiscal deficit may be
accompanied by an offsetting increase in private saving, leaving the
national saving and, therefore, investment unchanged. Then, there is no
impact on the real interest rate. Ricardian equivalence requires the9
assumption that individuals in the economy are foresighted, they have
discount rates that are equal to governments’ discount rates on spending
and they have extremely long time horizons for evaluating the present
value of future taxes. In particular, such a time horizon may well extend
beyond their own lives in which case they save with a view to making
altruistic transfers to take care of the tax liabilities of their future
generations.
The economic universe of these alternative schools of thought
also is characterised by individuals who differ in their behavioral
responses in critical respects. The Keynesian world is inhabited by
myopic, liquidity constrained individuals who behave under money
illusion, and have a high propensity to consume out of current disposable
income. The Ricardian equivalence people conceive of a universe of
farsighted, fully informed, altruistic individuals. The neo-classical world is
inhabited by rational individuals who respond to real changes in their
wealth portfolios, and who are farsighted enough to plan consumption
over their life-cycle. Table 1 summarises the main differences in these
alternative paradigms.
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In reality, an economy may be populated by all the three types of
consumers. Depending on which group is relatively larger, one or the
other theory may be found to be more relevant in different contexts.
The ‘Tax and Spend’ Hypothesis
A fourth hypothesis formalised by supply side economists, is
sometimes called the “tax and spend” hypothesis. An exposition of the
hypothesis is given in Vedder, Gallaway, and Frenze (1987).  In their
view, raising taxes with a view to cutting down deficits would not work
because it would only encourage the politicians to spend more. The
result would be that while the deficit would remain the same, in the long
run the size of the private sector would be cut down. In their view, a tax
cut, which puts pressure for contraction of government spending leaving
deficits and national savings unchanged, and which leads to an increase
in private consumption, should be considered more desirable.  The main
problem is that when government expenditure does not fall, it has to run
a deficit, which raises interest payments and causes total government
expenditure including interest payments to rise as a share of GDP.
III. Debt and Fiscal Deficit: Issues
in 
the Indian Context
The issue of fiscal deficit assumed importance in India in the late
eighties when the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio rose to levels above 7
percent. In the early nineties, it was above 9 percent, and after some
improvement, it started rising again, crossing the threshold of 10 percent
of GDP in 2001-02. In the context of fiscal deficits in India, several
distinct sets of issues have been examined from time to time. Some of
the important issues that have been noted in the literature are listed
below:
•  whether fiscal deficits of the central and state governments,
considered together, and separately are sustainable; 
•  whether these governments are solvent, given their debt and
deficit levels;11
•  whether the presence of high levels of structural fiscal
deficits has constrained the usability of fiscal policy as a tool
of stabilisation in respect of output as well as prices; 
•  whether there is a meaningful asymmetry between
accumulation of fiscal liabilities by the central and state
governments;
•  whether there is potential for additional seigniorage in the
system for financing fiscal deficits;
•  whether there is need to formulate rules and targets to
stabilise debt and deficits, and how should these targets be
derived;
•  whether, apart from the size, the quality of fiscal deficit has
progressively become more of a problem and, in particular,
whether the rising share of revenue deficit in fiscal deficit, i.e.
government dis-savings have resulted in a fall of the overall
saving rate, thereby adversely affecting growth;
•  whether fiscal deficits have crowded out private investment
by putting pressure on interest rates, thereby adversely
affecting growth;
•  whether continued high levels of fiscal deficits, resulting in
growing  interest payments, have crowded out government
capital expenditure; and
•  whether public investment financed by fiscal deficits has the
potential of crowding-in private investment, thereby positively
affecting growth.
These issues are interdependent as the impact of fiscal deficits
on growth affects its sustainability. Although the major focus of this study
is on the implications of fiscal deficits for growth and stabilisation, some
of the extant literature on the above issues is briefly reviewed here under
different heads. 
Fiscal Stance: Inflation and Output Stabilisation
One set of issues concerns whether the fiscal policy as a policy
instrument has been used to obtain the appropriate fiscal stance,
expansionary or otherwise, given the prevailing economic conditions
(e.g. Joshi and Little, 1994; and RBI, 2002). In this context, reviewing the
situation over the period 1974-75 to 1989-90, Joshi and Little (1994) had
observed that there was a clear tendency in India for fiscal contraction12
when inflation was above the trend, and fiscal expansion when inflation
was below the trend.  They found that in 19 out of 29 years during 1970-
71 to 1989-90, this tendency was clearly visible. On the other hand, the
fiscal stance was much less responsive to stabilising output.  They
observed that prima facie fiscal policy was destabilising in no less than
22 out of the 29 years under review in their study. In some of these
years, when output was below trend, the fiscal authorities were inhibited
from adopting an expansionary fiscal policy either by inflation or by
balance of payment difficulties. In the pre-1990 situation, in their view,
inflation was the main consideration guiding India’s fiscal policy.  Writing
at the beginning of 90s they observed “there would have been more
room for fiscal policy to be devoted to (stabilising output), if the economy
had possessed greater stocks of foreign exchange reserves and
commodities, specially food grains, the use of which would have reduced
inflation by increasing supplies, and would have either ameliorated or
financed a deterioration in the balance of payments”. In recent years,
these constraints have ceased to be binding, with a comfortable position
in regard to the foreign exchange reserves, stocks of food grains and
balance of payments.  There is therefore a case for aligning better the
fiscal stance to make it more responsive to output stabilisation. The
Reserve Bank of India (2002) in its Report on Currency and Finance for
2001-02, provides estimates of structural and cyclical fiscal deficits. In
their estimates, fiscal deficits in India are predominantly structural in
nature and the cyclical component is very small in magnitude ranging
between a deficit of 0.12 percent of GDP and a surplus of 0.21 percent of
GDP. Automatic stabilisers exist if revenues respond more to output
changes than expenditures. The RBI estimates that the elasticity of
receipts of the combined government sector is 1.07 whereas that for
combined non-interest expenditure is 1.06. Since the difference between
the two magnitudes is small, even if there is an automatic stabiliser, it is
likely to be weak. Discretionary fiscal measures are therefore required for
stabilisation.
Impact on Saving, Investment, and Growth
The link between fiscal deficit and growth, saving and investment
rates, inflation and current account deficits have also been examined in
many studies. The relationship between fiscal deficit and interest rate
and the existence of crowding out are important considerations in
determining the advisability of deficit-financed expansionary fiscal
policies. Authors like Sunderarajan and Thakur (1980); Pradhan et. al.,13
(1990); and Parker (1995) had earlier examined the issue of crowding
out in the Indian context. More recently, Chakraborty (2002) finds that
fiscal deficit does not put upward pressure on the interest rate while
Goyal (2004), using monthly data argues that there is a two-way
causality between fiscal deficit and interest rates. In his view, interest
rates did not rise in recent years in spite of high fiscal deficits because of
larger liquidity available to the system. RBI (2002) has noted that raising
public sector investment to boost aggregate demand in the economy
crowds-out both private consumption and investment with no long-lasting
impact on output. On the other hand, infrastructure investment by the
public sector crowds-in private investment while public investment in
manufacturing crowds-out private investment.
Solvency of the Public Sector
In the accounting approach to public sector solvency, Buiter
[1985, 1988] suggests that sustainable deficit levels can be financed
without raising debt levels relative to GDP under feasible rates of growth,
real interest, and inflation. Following the neo-classical solvency
approach, Buiter and Patel (1992) observe that the relevant criterion for
the no-ponzi game condition on public debt is to judge it by comparing
the rate of growth of public debt relative to GDP with the real interest
rate. If the debt ratio systematically grows faster than the real interest
rate, the public sector is insolvent.
Buiter and Patel (1992) examined the issue of solvency of the
Indian public sector by studying trends in debt, primary budget surplus,
and seigniorage. Solvency requires that, with a finite time horizon, public
debt in the last period becomes non- positive, i.e., no debt is left for
further servicing.  If the time horizon is infinity, the existing debt should
be serviceable by current and future primary surpluses and future
seigniorage. This implies that, at any time, the present value of future
public debt becomes zero in the limit. If it becomes less than zero, it
indicates a situation of ‘super-solvency’. The requirement of present
value of debt to be zero or less holds as long as the economy is not
dynamically inefficient, i.e. it is not the case where interest rate is below
growth rate forever. For a dynamically inefficient system (where growth
rate is higher than the interest rate forever) Ponzi games can be viable.
Buiter and Patel contend that while interest rate can be below the growth
rate for extended finite periods of time, the Indian economy is not
dynamically inefficient over the long run, and that “there are no social14
free lunches to be earned by increasing the public debt”. Calling the build
up of public debt in India, ‘this remarkable fiscal high wire act’, they
contend that continuation of existing patterns of behaviour will eventually
threaten the solvency of the government. They also observe that
solvency is a very weak criterion with which to evaluate the sustainability
of fiscal and financial policy. They observe that a government can remain
solvent even though its debt relative to GDP grows unbound, if the long
run growth rate of the debt-GDP ratio, while positive, is less than the long
run value of the excess of the interest rate over the growth rate. Thus,
unbounded debt-GDP ratios can still be consistent with solvency. The
issue of solvency could be important in the context of external debt, but
this does not appear to be much of a concern in the Indian context. The
issue of sustainability and its link with growth is more relevant.
Implications for Sustainability
The issue of sustainability of debt should be considered as
distinct from that of solvency. Sustainability can be seen as the capacity
to keep balance between costs of additional borrowing with returns from
such borrowing, which could be in the form of higher growth that results
in higher government revenues that can be used for servicing the
additional borrowing.  Sustainability issues should be viewed for
combinations of debt and fiscal deficit, and not in isolation for either debt
or fiscal deficit. Thus, a fiscal deficit of 10 percent combined with say a
debt-GDP ratio of 100 percent will have sustainability implications that
are quite different from those of a 10 percent fiscal deficit when the debt-
GDP ratio is 50 percent. Thus, sustainability should not be treated as
synonymous with stability of the debt-GDP ratio at whatever level it might
have reached.
The level of debt in combination with interest rate determines the
level of interest payments. Fiscal deficit minus interest payments
determine primary deficit. Primary deficit represents the extent of
borrowing used by the government for current expenditures, revenue and
capital. The remaining part of fiscal deficit is claimed by interest
payments, which are transfer payments that go back into the income-
expenditure stream. In particular, government interest payments add to
the disposable incomes in the private sector. This has implications for
government revenues as well.15
At the same time, interest payments add to government’s
revenue expenditures leaving less of current fiscal deficit for use for
government capital expenditure. Increases in revenue expenditures,
ceteris paribus, lead to a fall in government’s net savings, which has an
adverse impact on the overall savings and consequently on the growth
rate. However, private savings may be positively affected by a higher
fiscal deficit because of a positive impact due to higher wealth in the
private sector in the form of government bonds. As government capital
expenditure on infrastructure and other vital public goods is increased,
the growth impulse is positively affected. The impact of fiscal deficit and
level of debt on savings and investment as a result of the configuration of
these variables determines the impact on growth as well as interest rate.
Considering the various interrelationships involved, the appropriate
framework is a macroeconomic model.  Such a model can also bring
together the monetary side influences on interest, growth rate, and
inflation rates. Even while recognising that growth and interest rates are
endogenously determined, a large literature is devoted to sustainability
analytics treating growth and interest rates as exogenous. This approach
can be considered useful only as a frame of reference. It is relevant to
consider the impact of fiscal deficit and debt on the growth and interest
rates.
Debt would become unsustainable, if fiscal deficits follow a
course that leads to a self-perpetuating rise in the debt-GDP ratio, which
affects negatively the growth rate and positively the interest rate, such
that the existing levels of primary government expenditures cannot be
sustained, given the configuration of growth and interest rates. A
sustainable debt-deficit combination would be stable in terms of debt-
GDP ratio and fiscal-deficit GDP ratio consistent with the permissible
levels of primary expenditures.
An alternative method by which the sustainability issues have
been examined in the literature is to look at the growth and interest rates
as stochastic processes. Although such an analytical framework does
not help directly in designing fiscal policy, it helps ascertain whether debt
and deficits show signs of unsustainability. In a recent contribution,
Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos (1999) show that a test for sustainability
should check for the cointegartion of government expenditures and
revenues. If these are cointegrated with the cointegrating vector of (1, -
1), the necessary condition for sustainability of debt is satisfied. Jha and
Sharma (2004) have carried out empirical tests to ascertain whether16
government expenditures and revenues are cointegarted in India using
long time series data. They find, on the basis of a sample period starting
in the early fifties, that if structural breaks are taken into account,
government expenditures and revenues were cointegrated and, therefore
growth in government debt in India has been consistent with the
requirements of sustainability. An implication of the presence of
cointegration is that adjustments in revenues and expenditures take
place such that these move together. Thus, for example, if interest
payments to GDP ratios increase, adjustments in other components of
expenditure, notably, government capital expenditure which, by itself,
may not be desirable, would take place so that the co-movement of
expenditure with revenues is maintained.
Financing Deficits by Alternative Channels
The fourth issue, that has received attention, relates to the
relative merits of financing fiscal deficits by domestic borrowing, external
borrowing, or borrowing from the central bank. In theory, financing by
external debt would lead to pressure on the exchange rate. Financing
domestic debt by monetisation would put pressure on inflation and that
by domestic borrowing, on interest rates. For example, Moorthy et.al.,
(2000), while examining the issue of bond-financing versus monetisation,
in the context of debt stabilisation, conclude that the emphasis on market
borrowing rather than borrowing from the RBI as part of economic
reforms in India in the nineties has proved to be beneficial. In
Rangarajan, Basu, and Jhadav (1994), the inter-temporal budget
constraint was used to study the dynamic inter-linkages between
government deficits and alternative modes of financing these. In
particular, given the set of revenue and expenditure parameters, relevant
for the late eighties, it was shown that the bond-financing scenario led to
an explosive growth in the debt-GDP ratio, and the monetary-financing
scenario led to an unacceptably high inflation rate within a short span of
time
1.
Asymmetry in Central and Sub-National Debt
Another dimension that has received attention relates to the
desirability of asymmetric treatment of central and sub-national debt and
deficits on grounds of different degrees of endogeneity of interest, growth
and other relevant variables. For example, Chelliah (2001) has argued
that ‘we must recognise that the state is borrowing largely from outsiders17
and paying interest to them’ and that ‘state governments do not have
access to created credit’. In his view, the constraints on sub-national
deficits must be stronger than those pertaining to the central
government. The interest rates applicable to the borrowing by the states,
both average rates and marginal rates are higher as compared to those
for the centre, implying the need for more stringent norms for the same
rates of growth of GDP.
Controlling Debt and Deficit: Rules and Targets
Borrowing by the government often appears to be a softer option
than increasing taxes or reducing expenditures. That is why, as
established by international experience also, it is important to provide
exogenous limits on borrowing by governments, whether central or sub-
national. Such limits can be exercised through fiscal responsibility
legislations, or other institutional arrangements like the Australian Loan
Council and the Maastricht Treaty for member countries of the European
Economic Community. The Maastricht Treaty on Economic and
Monetary Union, for example, has two convergence conditions for the
members of the European Monetary Union: (i) country’s overall budget
deficit for each fiscal year must be equal to or below 3 percent of the
GDP and  (ii) a country’s stock of public debt must be equal to or less
than 60 percent of the GDP. The 3 percent limit is not meant to be
exceeded in ‘normal’ economic downturns.
There has been a discussion in the literature as to whether
deficit targeting works in practice. The main institutional reforms for
controlling the growth of debt and deficit relate to (i) formal deficit and
debt rules, (ii) expenditure limits, and (iii) requirements of transparency.
In regard to the first, apart from the Maastricht Treaty norms, the U. K.
has operated a Golden Rule since 1997 whereby borrowing is done only
to finance capital spending. Several countries have deficit and debt rules
at the sub national level.  In the US, all states except two have laws
requiring balanced budgets and limiting the states to raise debt. The
provinces and territories of Canada generally have fiscal rules with
balanced budgets requiring them to take on debt only for the purpose of
financing investment projects. Canada has also focused on instituting a
rigorous expenditure review process. Debt ceiling can serve as a useful
complement to deficit rules. The main criticism of the deficit rules in
general and balanced budget rules in particular is that they are invariant
and therefore tend to be pro-cyclical.  This is particularly important for18
national governments. For this reason the deficit rules for the national
government have increasingly been defined in terms of a cyclically
adjusted deficit measure or as an average over the economic cycle so
that the operation of domestic stabilisers and some room for
discretionary policy within the cycle may be permitted.
Transparency in fiscal management has been emphasised by
countries like New Zealand, Australia, and the U.K.  Transparency is
best served when there is an explicit legal provision for it requiring
elaboration of the guiding principles of fiscal policy, clear statement of
objectives of changes in fiscal policies, the need for a long term focus on
fiscal policy, and requirements for providing fiscal information to the
public.  The U.K., U.S., and New Zealand have enacted legislations for
transparency, which require statements indicating the objectives for
deficits and debt. International experience also suggests that expenditure
rules have often proved to be effective. These rules typically emphasise
ceilings on specific areas of expenditure like discretionary expenditure as
opposed to non-discretionary expenditure and in some cases with
respect to particular programmes.
In the Indian context, as far the central finances are concerned, a
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA) was
enacted in 2003. Some states have also enacted fiscal responsibility
legislations. The central government has also framed rules under the
FRBMA.  The Act and the Rules, as these presently stand, have
provided for the elimination of the revenue deficit by 2008-09, with 0.5
percentage point of GDP as the minimum annual reduction target, and
fiscal deficit to be brought to the level of 3 percent of GDP, with 0.3
percentage point of GDP, as the minimum annual reduction target. The
FRBMA has some built-in flexibility in achieving revenue and fiscal deficit
reduction targets as there is a provision that the specified limits may be
exceeded ‘due to ground or grounds of national security or national
calamity or such other exceptional grounds as the Central Government
may specify’. The Act has also provided that ‘Reserve Bank of India may
subscribe to the primary issues to the Central Government Securities’ for
specified reasons.19
IV. Sustainability of Debt and Fiscal
Deficit
In Domar’s analysis of the dynamics of debt accumulation, both
interest rate and growth rate are taken as exogenous. Based on this
assumption, results can be derived that can serve as useful benchmarks. 
Sustainability Analytics Under the Canonical (Domar) Model 
In considering the dynamics of debt accumulation, the following
notations will be used: bt: debt-GDP ratio in period t; gt: nominal growth
rate in period t; it: nominal interest rate in period t; and pt: primary deficit
relative to GDP in period t. The standard equation for debt accumulation
is written as
2 
bt = pt + bt-1[(1+it)/ (1+gt)] (1)
Equation 1 can be written as 
bt = pt + xtbt-1              [ where xt = (1+it)/ (1+gt)] (2)
If b0 = p0, 
we have, b1 = p1 + x1 p0
b2 = p2+ x2p1 +x2x1p0
Generalising, we can write
bt = pt + (xt) pt-1+ (xtxt-1) pt-2+…. + (xtxt-1….x1) p0 (3)
If it is assumed that xt is constant, implying g and i are constant
for all t, 
We can write




The canonical model (Domar, 1944) requires the additional
assumption that p’s are also constant for all t. Since xt = (1+it)/(1+gt) = x
for all t, three cases arise (1) when g = i, (2) when g > i, and (3) when
g<i.
In the first case, we can write                     
                         t-1
           bt = p + ∑p = (t+1) p (5)
                        
 i=0
This implies that if g=i, the debt-GDP ratio is the cumulated sum
of the primary deficits in all the previous periods. In the second case,
when g>i,
           




The term within parenthesis is a geometric series with common
ratio x<1. As t tends to infinity, this sum tends to x/ (1-x). Then the long
run value of the debt-GDP ratio can be written as
           bt = p + p x/ (1-x) = p/ (1-x)
           bt = p (1+g)/ (g-i) as t →∞ (7)
In the third case, when g<i, x>1, and b t will grow indefinitely.
Thus, a value of p>0, will eventually become unsustainable for
both cases when g=i and when g<i. In the case, when g=i, the debt-GDP
ratio grows linearly by the size of the primary deficit, and when g<i, the
debt-GDP ratio grows explosively if the primary deficit-GDP ratio is
positive.
We will now focus on the case where g>i. From (7), the long run
equilibrium value of bt = b* is given by
           b* = p (1+g)/ (g-i) (8)
The fiscal deficit to GDP ratio (f*) corresponding to a stable debt-
GDP ratio (b*) will be:
 f*=p.g/ (g-i) (9)21
Equations (8) and (9) provide a system of two equations in three
unknowns, viz., b, f, and p, assuming values of g and i are given (g>i),
and consistent with the a stable debt-GDP ratio
3. It is indicated that high
values of p will be associated with high levels of b and f. However, these
equations do not provide a unique solution as the unknowns are more
than the number of the equations.
Using equations (8) and (9) together, the relationship between b*
and f* can be written as:
b*=f*.(1+g)/ g (10)
The pair (b*, f*) gives that level of fiscal deficit-GDP ratio at
which the debt-GDP ratio remains unchanged at b*. As shown in Figure
1, equation (10) gives a family of straight lines rising to the right, showing
combinations of fiscal deficit-GDP ratio and corresponding stable debt-
GDP ratio, for a given growth rate. This line shifts upward as growth
rates are lowered.
Figure 1: Stable Combinations of Debt- and Fiscal Deficit to GDP
Ratios for Different Growth Rates
Vertical axis: debt-GDP ratio; Horizontal axis: fiscal deficit-GDP ratio.22
For lower growth rates, the line is closer to the vertical axis; as growth rates
are higher, for the same fiscal deficit ratio, debt-GDP ratios are lower.
Alternatively, the stabilisation conditions can be expressed in an
equivalent way in terms of the ratio of interest payments to GDP.
Defining interest payments to GDP ratio as (ipy), we have
IPt = i.Bt-1 or (ipy)t = ibt-1/ (1+g) (11)
As debt is stabilised bt=bt-1=b* and (ipy) t = (ipy)* t
            b*= (ipy)* .(1+g)/i (12)
The corresponding level of fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is given by
            f* = (ipy)* g/i (13)
Equations (12) and (13) provide a set of two equations in terms
of three unknowns, (b, f, and ipy). Again, the system can determine
unique values of any two of the three unknowns, provided one of the
unknown is pre-specified. Clearly, additional information is needed to
solve the system described by either (8) and (9) or (12) and (13).
The critical question is whether, when g>i, sustainability is
implied for any value p>0. To address this question, it is useful to
recognise that g t and i t are neither constant nor independent of the level
of p. In particular, both gt and it should be taken as stochastic processes
and dependent on the levels of debt and fiscal deficit relative to GDP. At
any time t, the debt-GDP ratio bt will be higher than its previous year’s
level bt-1, as long as the primary deficit to GDP ratio in the current period




Here, it is the average interest rate and p
s
t is called the debt-
stabilising primary deficit to GDP ratio. As long as pt in any given year is
equal to or less than p
s
t for that year, debt-GDP ratio will not rise in that
year compared to its level in the previous year. Since p
s
t depends on the
difference between gt and it, it is important to consider how should p be
determined in any year since it may affect g and i in that year.23
The pre-specification of either the primary-deficit to GDP ratio or
the ratio of interest payments to GDP requires consideration of the
appropriate fiscal stance in the medium to long term. The medium term
fiscal stance should aim at achieving the maximum possible trend growth
rate. Such a fiscal stance should be consistent with growth-maximising
combination of stable debt-GDP ratio and a stable fiscal deficit to GDP
ratio consistent with both maximum growth and stable debt-GDP ratio.
The short fiscal stance should be designed to keep the economy close to
the long term growth and debt-GDP ratios using temporary variations in
fiscal deficit.  These issues are discussed in the next section.
The main lessons from the canonical model can be summarised
as follows:
•  The debt-GDP ratio will rise continuously for positive values
of the primary deficit relative to GDP, if the growth rate is
equal to or less than the interest rate. 
•  If growth rate is higher than the interest rate, and both of
these are unaffected by the levels of fiscal deficit and debt
levels relative to GDP, the debt-GDP ratio and the fiscal
deficit to GDP ratio will eventually stabilise. 
•  The level of fiscal deficit relative to GDP that keeps the debt-
GDP ratio stable can be specified as dependent on the
growth rate only. 
•  The system of equations implicit in the canonical model can
define combinations of stable debt-GDP ratio and fiscal
deficit to GDP ratio but does not determine their best or most
desirable values.   
•  In deciding a suitable fiscal stance for the medium to long
run, it is best to consider the debt-GDP ratio and fiscal deficit
to GDP ratio together rather than only one of them.  
•  The long term fiscal stance requires additional information
on the impact of debt and deficit levels on growth, and the
assumption of constancy of growth and interest rates should
be given up.  In this case, the ratio of debt to GDP will rise
progressively, even if the growth rate is higher than the
interest rate, if primary deficit to GDP ratio is above a
threshold level given by p
s, which can be specified as24
dependent on previous year’s debt-GDP ratio, growth rate
and interest rate.
The following section provides an analytical framework within
which the trend or structural values of a debt-stabilising and growth-
maximising fiscal stance may be determined. The short-term fiscal
stance can subsequently be decided around the long-run levels. 
Sustainability, Optimality, and Stability
The canonical framework indicates permissible levels of primary
deficits for given combinations of growth and interest rates, for different
levels of the debt-GDSP ratio. It does not indicate whether, a higher or
lower debt-GDP ratio may also be sustainable. It also does not indicate
as to what may be the optimal ratio at which the debt-GDP ratio should
be stabilised
4. These questions require a consideration of the impact of
debt and deficit on interest rates and growth rates. Since various
interrelationships are involved, in effect, a macro-model with the
specification of the relevant structural equations is required. However, for
explaining the conceptual framework in distinguishing between stability,
optimality, and sustainability, we consider first a diagrammatic
framework. It is assumed that both growth rate and interest rate may be
functions of fiscal deficit, among other factors, and that this relationship
is non-linear in both cases. As fiscal deficit levels relative to GDP rise
initially the growth rate rises up to a point. This is so because, initially, as
fiscal deficit rises, government investment also increases, which crowds-
in private investment and also positively affects the private savings as
the bond holdings of the private sector increases. As shown in figure 1,
higher levels of fiscal deficit would be associated with higher levels of
debt-GDP ratio at which it can be stabilised. With the higher debt-GDP
ratio, the interest payments to GDP ratio also increase. Beyond a point,
interest payments become so large as to result in  revenue deficit, given
other parameters, particularly the ratio of revenue receipts to GDP. As
revenue deficit rises, government savings and capital expenditures fall.
The overall saving rate also falls, and the growth rate begins to fall.
Also, as fiscal deficit relative to GDP rises, interest rate rises
slowly in the initial stages. However, at very large levels of fiscal deficit
relative to GDP with the associated high levels of debt-GDP ratios,
interest rates rise steeply. Figure 2 has four quadrants. In quadrant I, the
growth rate curve [g=G(f,..)] shows growth rates at different levels of
fiscal deficit relative to GDP under ceteris paribus assumptions and the25
interest rate curve [i=I(f,..)] shows interest rates at different fiscal deficit
to GDP ratios under similar assumptions. Both growth and interest rates
are in nominal terms. The growth curve lies above the interest rate curve
for the range shown by OB on the horizontal axis. Throughout this range
a country can afford to have a primary deficit.
In quadrant IV, the debt-GDP ratio is shown on the vertical axis.
For any given growth rate, a curve showing the debt-GDP ratio for levels
of fiscal deficit ratio can be shown, capturing the relationship
[b*=f*(1+g)/g]. This relationship is the same as depicted in figure 1,
except that it is now shown upside down. For higher levels of growth
rate, the curve will shift inward towards the horizontal axis, showing that
with a higher growth, the debt-GDP ratio can be maintained at a lower
level for a given fiscal deficit to GDP ratio.
The interest rate associated with any fiscal deficit to GDP ratio in
the first quadrant is taken to the horizontal axis of quadrant II, through a
45
0 line. Using this and the debt-GDP ratio shown in quadrant IV, the
ratio of interest payments to GDP can be shown as their product in
quadrant III, that is, by the area of the relevant rectangle. As an example,
two growth rates are considered: a low growth rate (gl) and a high growth
(gh). With the high growth rate, the interest payments to GDP ratio shown
by the rectangle OPRb(gh) is much lower than that associated with the
lower growth rate as shown by OQSb(gl). Considering quadrant I again,
the levels of fiscal deficit in the range BC require primary surpluses to
keep the debt-GDP ratio constant. But in this range interest payments
relative to GDP would have become so high as to make obtaining
primary surplus very difficult. Close to the left of point B on the horizontal
axis, while primary deficit may be permissible, interest payments are too
large leading to government dissavings resulting in growth rates that are
less than the potentially achievable levels. In effect, the optimal level of
fiscal deficit is given by OA, where growth is highest obtainable, primary
deficit is consistent with sustainability, and interest payments are
relatively low so that government is able to make enough savings that
can contribute to attaining the higher growth. Combinations of high fiscal
deficit and debt relative to GDP are detrimental to growth. While it may
appear that primary deficit can be maintained for a large range of fiscal
deficit to GDP ratios, it is appropriate to search, in the context of a
medium-to-long term fiscal stance, for the growth maximising
combination of fiscal deficit and debt relative to GDP, and attempt to hold
the economy around this combination.26
Analytically speaking, the issue is one of determining that level of
fiscal deficit, which will stabilise the debt-GDP ratio and, at the same
time, can promote growth. The question is not whether or not there
should be deficit. The relevant question is the appropriate level of deficit.
The preceding analytical expose is aimed at obtaining certain directional
guidelines in this regard. An important consideration in deciding the
appropriate level of fiscal deficit will be the existing level of debt-GDP
ratio. When this ratio is adversely impacting savings and investment,
fiscal deficit may have to be brought down sharply until the debt-GDP
ratio reaches a level at which the overall savings ratio will be consistent
with achieving the medium-term growth potential of the economy. It is
also important to distinguish between long-term and short-term
components of fiscal deficit. We review below the impact of high interest
payments relative to GDP on saving and investment in India.
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Figure 2: Aspects of Fiscal and Debt Sustainability27
V. Fiscal Deficit, Saving, and
Investment
in India
An understanding of the behaviour of saving and investment by the
private and public sectors is important for considering their impact on
fiscal deficit and vice versa. As long as the household sector is providing
enough financeable savings, these may be absorbed by the public sector
without putting pressure on the interest rates. Also, it has been argued
that any reduction in public saving is a loss to the overall saving rate on a
one to one basis. 
Trends in Saving and Investment in India
In this section, we look at the profile of the saving-GDP ratio
(henceforth, saving rate) since 1950-51 and the relative contribution of
the household, private corporate, and public sectors. The following
symbols are used:
I = Gross domestic capital formation at current prices
Ia= Gross domestic capital formation at current prices adjusted for
errors and     omissions (investment)
S= Gross domestic savings at current prices( savings)
Ih= Gross domestic capital formation by the household sector
Ic= Gross domestic capital formation by the private corporate
sector
Ip= Gross domestic capital formation by the public sector
Sh= Gross domestic savings by the household sector
Shf= Gross domestic financial savings by the household sector
Sc= Gross domestic savings by the private corporate sector
Sp= Gross domestic savings by the public sector
Dc= Shortfall of the savings of the private corporate sector relative
to its investment
Dp= Shortfall of the savings of the public sector relative to its
investment
Eh= Excess of the saving of the household sector relative to its
investment28
Z = Excess of adjusted gross domestic capital formation over
gross domestic savings
E = Errors and omissions in gross domestic capital formation
From these, the following identities can then be written:
Gross investment is the sum of investments in household, private
corporate, and public sectors:
Ih + Ic + Ip = I (15)
Gross capital formation minus errors and omissions gives
‘adjusted’ investment
I = Ia + E (16)
Savings are the sum of household, private corporate, and public
sector savings:
Sh + Sc + Sp = S (17)
S + Z = Ia  (18)
The excess of public sector investment over its own saving is
financed by excess of domestic sector saving over domestic investment
net of the private sector investment over their saving plus the adjustment
terms.
(Ip-Sp) = (Sh-Ih) – (Ic-Sc) + Z (19)
or (Ip-Sp) - (Sh-Ih) = (Ic-Sc) + Z
or + Dc = Eh + Z (20)
It is the excess of household saving over its domestic investment
that is being used to finance the excess of investment over saving for
both the public and the private corporate sectors. It may also be seen
that the financial saving of the household sector is identically equal to the
excess of total saving of the household sector over its investment (Shf =
Sh-Ih).
 
Table A1 gives the saving-GDP ratio of the household, private
corporate, and public sectors in India over the period 1950-51 to 2001-
02. The public sector relative to GDP had peaked in 1976-77 at 4.9
percent. They fell marginally but had a local peak in 1981-82 at 4.529
percent. Since then there has been a steady decline. The public sector
saving to GDP ratio turned negative in 1998-99 and the dis-saving
relative to GDP continued to increase in magnitude reaching a level of
negative 2.5 percent in 2001-02.  This amounts to a fall of 7 percentage
points from the level of 4.5 percent achieved in 1981-82. Chart 4 shows
the profile of the saving-GDP ratio of the household, private corporate,
and public sectors over the period 1951-52 to 2001-02. Starting from a
level of just 6 percent of GDP, the household sector saving ratio has
shown a steady rise reaching levels of 22 percent of GDP.
The saving ratio of the private corporate sector has been
somewhat stagnant at below 2 percent of GDP until 1987-88 after which
it steadily rose to cross 4 percent of GDP in 1995-96. Since then it has
generally been above 4 percent but is not rising any further. The public
sector savings, which reached a peak in 1976-77 have now become
negative. Chart 5 shows the time profile of public and private investment
relative to GDP since 1950-51. Until 1988-89, both of these were rising
along a trend path. Since then, while private investment has continued to
rise along a trend path, public investment has fallen steeply. In the latter
part of the nineties, it may be noted that the private investment demand
fell. In particular,  the  private  corporate  sector  investment  demand  fell 30
Chart 1: Savings Relative to GDP: Household, Private
Corporate and Public Sector
from a peak of 9.6 percent of GDP in 1995-96 to 4.8 percent in 2001-02.
Among other factors, the fall in the nominal interest rates in the latter part
of the nineties is attributable to the decline in corporate investment.
     
Chart 2: Investment Relative to GDP: Private and Public Sector
Within the public sector, savings and investment of
administrative departments and departmental enterprises is referred to
as ‘government’ savings and investment. These are more directly related
to fiscal deficit, and its impact on growth. The remaining public sector
comprises non-departmental enterprises and quasi-government bodies.
Table 2 gives the saving-investment profile of the different components
of the public sector. Comparing 1996-97 with 2001-02 figures, it is31
apparent that the draft of the government sector (administrative
departments and departmental enterprises) as measured by the excess
of investment over saving has increased from 4.7 percent of GDP to 8.6
percent in 2001-02. This was clearly the result of the increase in the ratio
of revenue deficit to fiscal deficit during this period. It did not lead to a
rise in the interest rate because of the fall in private investment as well
as government investment during this period. The key to improving the
medium term fiscal stance that can sustain a higher growth rate is to
reduce government dissavings and increase government capital
expenditure relative to GDP. These changes can happen when the pre-
emptive claim of interest payments relative to GDP falls and/or
government revenues relative to GDP rise.
Table 2: Gross Domestic Saving and Capital Formation of the 
Public Sector Relative to GDP





























1993-94 -3.16 0.86 2.79 0.14 -2.30 2.93
1994-95 -2.68 0.99 3.23 0.12 -1.69 3.36
1995-96 -2.14 0.83 3.19 0.14 -1.30 3.33
1996-97 -2.41 0.75 3.25 0.09 -1.66 3.34
1997-98 -2.92 0.68 3.45 0.13 -2.25 3.58
1998-99 -5.23 0.57 3.53 0.14 -4.66 3.67
1999-00 -5.10 0.57 3.36 0.14 -4.53 3.49
2000-01 -5.55 0.23 2.86 0.14 -5.32 3.00
2001-02 -6.22 0.04 3.29 0.14 -6.18 3.43
2002-03 -5.81 0.09 3.72 0.14 -5.72 3.87
Gross Domestic Investment        
1993-94 1.68 1.94 4.47 0.15 3.62 4.62
1994-95 1.93 1.80 4.85 0.16 3.73 5.01
1995-96 1.77 1.72 3.96 0.14 3.49 4.11
1996-97 1.66 1.54 3.71 0.12 3.20 3.83
1997-98 1.44 1.60 3.44 0.14 3.04 3.5732
1998-99 1.61 1.40 3.37 0.19 3.02 3.56
1999-00 1.70 1.48 3.58 0.18 3.18 3.76
2000-01 1.70 0.11 4.30 0.18 1.81 4.48
2001-02 1.61 0.81 3.23 0.19 2.41 3.4133
Table 2: Gross Domestic Saving and Capital Formation of the
Public Sector Relative to GDP (contd.)




























Excess of Investment over Saving      
1993-94 4.84 1.08 1.68 0.01 5.92 1.69
1994-95 4.61 0.81 1.62 0.03 5.42 1.65
1995-96 3.91 0.89 0.78 0.00 4.80 0.78
1996-97 4.07 0.79 0.46 0.03 4.86 0.49
1997-98 4.36 0.92 -0.01 0.00 5.28 0.00
1998-99 6.84 0.83 -0.16 0.05 7.67 -0.11
1999-00 6.81 0.90 0.22 0.05 7.71 0.27
2000-01 7.25 -0.13 1.44 0.04 7.13 1.48
2001-02 7.83 0.76 -0.06 0.05 8.59 -0.01
Source: National Income Accounts, CSO.
Some Empirical Relations
In the argument that high levels of debt-GDP lead to high interest
payments relative to GDP, which crowd out government capital
expenditure and reduce the overall saving rate, two relationships are of
critical importance:
•  The responsiveness of changes in the saving ratio with
respect to changes in the fiscal deficit levels; and
•  The responsiveness of government capital expenditure to
changes in the level of interest payments.
We provide some empirical estimates of the short-term and long-
term relationships, using a sample period from 1950-51 to 2001-02. With
the concept of cointegration proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), it
has been possible to distinguish between long-run equilibrium relations
and short-term dynamics among variables. Identification conditions
between cointegrated time series models or error correction models (also
known as equilibrium correction models) have been explored in34
Johansen (1991), and Johansen and Juselius (1995). In Hsiao (1997), it
was shown that under certain conditions, virtually all the results for the
stationary case also apply to structural models involving integrated
variables. It is also demonstrated that the identification of long-run
equilibrium relations is not independent of the short-run dynamics.
In the present analysis, the dynamics of a few key relations is
studied. The estimated structural relationships should be considered as
embedded in a full structural model and as preliminary findings. The
variables used in this exercise are defined below. Variables in real terms
are derived by deflating by the implicit price deflator of GDP at factor cost
(IPDFC). In the case of interest rate, the inflation rate pertaining to the
IPDFC is deducted to obtain the real interest rate. First differences are
shown by prefixing a variable by D, and the second difference, by
prefixing a variable by DD.
IPDFC: Implicit price deflator of GDP at factor cost
SPVR: private sector saving in real terms 
PVYR: private disposable income in real terms
SPUBR: public sector saving in real terms
I3R: interest rate on deposits of 3 to 5 years
I3SR: ex-ante interest rate on deposits of 3 to 5 years obtained by
deducting from I3R, the expected rate of inflation
IPVTR: private investment in real terms
ISBI: State Bank of India advance rate
RISBI: State Bank of India advance rate in real terms obtained by
deducting the inflation rate
RCMRR: combined revenue receipts of the central and state
governments in real terms
RCMIP: interest payments on the combined account of central and
state governments in real terms
RCMCE: combined capital expenditure of the central and state
governments in real terms
CMDFD: combined derived fiscal deficit
Private Savings Function: Impact of Public Savings
A critical hypothesis that requires to be tested is whether any fall
in the public sector savings, implying an increase in revenue deficit, is
compensated by a rise in private sector savings, and if that is so whether
the compensation is full or partial and whether the effect takes place with35
a lag. Real private savings appear to have a unit root not only in levels
but also in first differences. It becomes stationary in second difference
with intercept and trend. The explanatory variables are private
disposable income( PVYR) in real terms and public sector savings
(SPUBR). Both of these are obtained by deflating the corresponding
nominal series by the implicit price deflator of GDP (IPDFC) at factor
cost. Both of these variables are stationary in first difference with
intercept and trend. A third explanatory variable is the expected real
interest rate. The interest rate is represented here by the interest rates
on deposits of 3 to 5 years. The corresponding interest rate is obtained
by deducting from the nominal interest rate, the expected inflation rate.
The inflation rate pertains to the implicit price deflator of GDP at factor
cost (IPDFC) from which trend inflation rate is estimated by using the H-
P filter. Accordingly a series for expected real interest rate (SI3R) is
generated.
Table 3 gives results of the estimation of the error correction
model [ECM], which estimates together the long-run relation and the
short-term dynamics. While private savings respond positively to private
disposable income, the effect of public saving is negative, implying that a
fall in public savings is associated with a rise in private saving but the
compensation is partial. The effect is negative both in the level and the
first difference. The positive sign and the magnitude of the lagged
dependent term show that the long-term effect is higher than the short-
run effect.
Table 3: Dependent Variable: SPVR
Sample (adjusted): 1953 2002
Included observations: 50 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
C -18068.6 4053.9 -4.457 0.000
PVYR 0.154422 0.030 5.085 0.000
SPUBR -0.294430 0.111 -2.661 0.011
DSPUBR(-1) -0.514448 0.210 -2.448 0.018
DPVYR(-1) 0.094398 0.076 1.245 0.220
SPVR(-1) 0.496261 0.111 4.459 0.000
R-squared 0.996579 Mean dependent var 94558.22
Adjusted R-squared 0.99619 S.D. dependent var 94033.24
S.E. of regression 5804.129 Akaike info criterion 20.28269
Sum squared resid 1.48E+09 Schwarz criterion 20.5121436
Table 3: Dependent Variable: SPVR (contd.)
Sample (adjusted): 1953 2002
Included observations: 50 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
Log likelihood -501.0673 F-statistic 2563.459
Durbin-Watson stat 1.73141 Prob (F-statistic) 0
Fiscal Deficit and Government Capital Expenditure
It has been argued in an earlier section that as interest rates
increase relative to current revenues of the government, a process of
adjustment starts in government expenditure. This may lead to a
reduction in public investment, particularly, government investment
relative to GDP. We look at the relationship between government capital
expenditure, interest payments and revenue receipts with reference to
the combined account of central and state governments. These are
converted into real terms by deflating with the GDP deflator. All the three
series are stationary in first difference. Table 4 gives the estimated
relationship within the ECM framework. It is seen that while interest
payments in real terms affect negatively the real government capital
expenditure, revenue receipts in real terms have a positive impact.
Table 4: Dependent Variable: RCMCE
Method: Least squares
Sample (adjusted): 1953 2002
Included observations: 50 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 824.1816 1008.755 0.817028 0.4182
RCMIP -0.452654 0.110548 -4.094651 0.0002
RCMRR 0.237316 0.053105 4.468815 0.0001
DRCMRR(-1) -0.103212 0.09703 -1.063706 0.2931
RCMCE(-1) 0.545986 0.096808 5.639866 0
R-squared 0.951796     Mean dependent var 25509.16
Adjusted R-squared 0.947511     S.D. dependent var 13173.31
S.E. of regression 3018.071     Akaike info criterion 18.95726
Sum squared resid 4.10E+08     Schwarz criterion 19.14847
Log likelihood -468.9316     F-statistic 222.1319
Durbin-Watson stat 1.941086     Prob(F-statistic) 037
VI. Growth in Combined Debt of Centre
and States: A Historical Perspective
The decision as to the appropriate level of fiscal deficit in the
current period has to take into account the levels of the accumulated
debt relative to GDP, particularly in view of the impact it has on interest
liabilities. In an earlier contribution, we had looked at the experience of
debt accumulation in respect of central debt-relative to GDP [Rangarajan
and Srivastava, 2003]. In this paper, we look at the growth of the
combined debt-GDP ratio and examine the relative contribution of
cumulated primary deficits and the cumulated effect of the excess of
growth rate over interest rate over the period 1951-52 to 2001-02.
Interest rate in this discussion refers to the effective interest rate of the
central and state governments, calculated as the ratio of interest
payments in a year to the outstanding liabilities at the beginning of the
year.  Throughout the forty-five year stretch from 1955-56 to 1999-00,
the growth rate was in excess of the interest rate.  Since 2000-01, for
three consecutive years, the growth rate has been less than the interest
rate both in real and nominal terms. During the nineties, even when the
GDP growth rate remained in excess of the interest rate, the gap
between the two has been narrowing.
The standard specification of the equation describing debt
dynamics with discrete time periods is given by equation (1) [bt = pt + bt-1
{(1+it)/ (1+gt)}]. As discussed in Rangarajan and Srivastava (2003),
writing zt = bt - bt-1, equation (1) can also be written as
zt = pt - bt-1 [(gt –it) (1+gt)
-1]
or pt = zt + bt-1 [(gt –it) (1+gt)
-1]( 2 1 )
Summing up over any two benchmark years 1 and T, we have
Σ pt = Σ zt +   Σ bt-1 [(gt –it) (1+gt)
-1] (t=1,…, T) (22)
The term
A1= Σ zt /Σ pt (t=1,…T) (23)38
shows the extent to which the  cumulated primary deficits translate into
accumulation of debt. On the other hand, the term
A2=Σ bt-1  [(gt –it )(1+gt )
-1]  /Σ pt (t=1,…T) (24)
shows the extent to which the impact of cumulated primary deficits is
absorbed by the excess of growth over interest rate. For the purpose of
the historical review, debt includes external debt evaluated at historical
exchange rates and state debt does not include reserve funds and
deposits.
According to available information, the combined debt-GDP ratio
of the central and state governments at the end of 1950-51 was 29.6
percent. During 1951-52 to 1959-60 a little less than 13 percentage
points were added to the debt-GDP ratio. An additional accretion of
about 4 percentage points took place in the sixties.  In the seventies,
there was hardly any change in the debt-GDP ratio.  It was in the eighties
and nineties (up to 2002-03) that there was an increase respectively of
14.7 percentage points for each period in the debt-GDP ratio. Table 5
and chart 3 show the relative effects of the cumulated primary deficits
and the factor reflecting the effect of growth-interest rate differential in
the process of accumulation of combined debt of the central and state
governments since 1951-52. The Indian experience shows that a
significant part of the pressure of primary deficit could be absorbed by
the excess of growth over interest rates. In particular, it was able to
absorb nearly 72 percent of the cumulated primary deficits. Had this
cushion not been available, cumulated primary deficits through 1951-52
to 2002-03 would have added about 169 percentage points to the
combined debt to GDP ratio.39
Chart 3: Growth of State Debt Relative to GDP: Relative Roles of
Cumulated Primary Deficits and Excess of Growth Over 
Interest Rates
Key:
Cum p: Cumulated primary deficit to GDP ratio
Cum b: Cumulated debt to GDP ratio
Cum w (g-i): Cumulated effect of weighted excess of growth over interest
rate
The decade-wise picture indicates that in the fifties, 33.5 percent
of the impact of cumulative primary deficit was absorbed by the growth-
interest rate differential. The remaining 66.4 percent of the cumulated
primary deficit of 19.4 percentage points resulted in an increase in the
debt-GDP ratio of 12.9 percentage points.   In the sixties, the pressure
put by the cumulated primary deficit was relatively larger (32.2
percentage points).  However, 88 percent of this was absorbed by the
differential of growth over interest rate, resulting in only a small increase
of 3.9 percentage points in the debt-GDP ratio. During the seventies,40
nearly hundred percent of the impact of  cumulated primary deficit was
absorbed  by the growth/ interest rate differential leading to a negligible
increase in the debt-GDP ratio. In the eighties and the nineties (up to
2002-03), about 72 and 62 percent respectively of the pressure of
cumulated primary deficit could be absorbed by the (g-i) differential.
Chart 3 also shows how the accumulated primary deficit was the most
persistent factor in causing the debt-GDP ratio to rise and how the
growth-interest differential was able to absorb a significant portion of it in
several stretches of time.
Table 5: Decadewise Decomposition of Debt Accumulation 
Relative to GDP
 




















1951-52 to 1959-60 12.89 19.39 6.50 66.47 33.53
1960-61 to 1969-70 3.87 32.18 28.31 12.03 87.97
1970-71 to 1979-80 0.07 26.18 26.12 0.25 99.75
1980-81 to 1989-90 14.71 52.09 37.38 28.24 71.76
1990-91 to 2002-03 14.67 39.09 24.42 37.53 62.47
1951-52 to 2002-03 46.21 168.94 122.73 27.82 72.18
Memo:
1996-97 to 2002-03 19.55 19.77 0.22 101.14 1.13
Debt-GDP Ratio at the end of--
1950-51 29.6
2002-03 75.8        
Source: (Basic Data): Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Government of
India, and National Income Accounts, CSO.
However, for three consecutive years, viz., 2000-01, 2001-02,
and 2002-03, the nominal growth rate fell below the effective interest
rate. In these years, instead of absorbing the impact of primary deficits,
the growth-interest differential, being negative, worked in the reverse by
adding to the debt-GDP ratio. Further, since this effect depends on the
previous year’s debt-GDP ratio, its impact became progressively larger
for the same shortfall in the growth rate relative to the interest rate. At the41
end of 2002-03, the combined debt-GDP ratio stood at 76 percent when
external debt is evaluated at historical exchange rates and, for the
states, reserve funds and deposits are not included. If these adjustments
are made, the combined debt-GDP ratio at the end of 2002-23 is
estimated to be about 85 percent of GDP.
VII. Medium and Short Term Fiscal 
Policy Stance
The management of fiscal deficit needs to distinguish between
the long term or trend growth after adjusting for the cyclical component of
growth and correspondingly between structural or cyclically neutral deficit
and transitory deficit. The structural deficit must be determined within a
sustainability framework aiming at maximising trend growth rate. The
short-term component of fiscal deficit should be used to minimise the
impact of cyclical changes while keeping the economy along its long
term growth path. The use of discretionary expenditure to stimulate the
economy when it is below potential output and contain inflationary
pressure when prices are above trend levels is meant to serve the
objective of macroeconomic stabilisation. The neo-classical analysis
argues about the deleterious effect of high permanent deficits on savings
and suggests stabilising fluctuations around the equilibrium path with
high rather than low level of national savings.
In the Maastricht Treaty (MT) norms read with the Pact on
Growth and Stability (PSG), it is provided for the member countries that
under normal circumstances the structural balance should be zero and,
when facing a slow-down, the net budget deficit could be up to a
maximum of 3 percent of GDP
5. On a long-term basis the debt-GDP ratio
should not be allowed to exceed 60 percent of GDP. It is only under an
exceptional down turn or recession that the budget deficit may be
allowed to exceed the 3 percent reference value
6.
Measuring Structural and Cyclical Components of Deficit
Several methods have been used in the literature for estimating
structural deficit. Considering actual fiscal deficits as the sum of
structural and cyclical components, if one of the two components is42
estimated, the other can be derived as a residual. There are three main
methods that have been used in the literature: (a) constant elasticities
method, where the cyclical component is estimates first based on
estimated of revenue and expenditure elasticities with respect to income;
(b) smoothed-ratio approach where the structural fiscal deficit is
estimated first by smoothening the revenue and expenditure ratios to
GDP; and (c) structural time series approach where time-varying
elasticities are  used and the cyclical component is estimated first. There
are some difficulties with each of these approaches. The more traditional
approach of constant elasticities  used by OECD, among others, involves
a three-step procedure. First, the output gap is calculated by taking the
difference between potential output and actual output; secondly,
response of revenue and expenditure categories to changes in the
output gap are calculated by estimating the relevant elasticities,
providing an estimate of the cyclical component of deficit; and finally, the
structural deficit is calculated as a residual. As shown by Barrel et.al.,
(1994), and Bradner, Diebalk, and Schuberth (1998), estimates of
structural balances are highly sensitive to the method of estimating trend
output and uncertainty surrounding the output-elasticities of expenditure
and revenue categories. The structural time series approach, as
suggested by Jaeger (1990), also has some problems. In particular, the
variances of the parameters are not well defined. It has been shown by
Harvey (1989) that in such models, the exogenous variables must be
bounded from above and non-stochastic.  Url (1997) has pointed out that
nominal potential output cannot be regarded as bounded from above.
The smoothed-ratio approach, suggested by Cano and Kanutin (1996)
provides a direct and simpler method of calculating the structural deficit.
In this approach, revenues and expenditures, expressed as ratios to
GDP, are decomposed into a structural and residual component by using
a Hodrick – Prescott (H-P) filter
7.
Let rs and es be the trend ratios of revenues and expenditures
relative to GDP (these can be disaggregated categories also), and rc and
ec be corresponding cyclical components. Then the structural deficit to
GDP ratio is derived directly as
fs= es-rs (25)
The cyclical deficit fc is obtained as a residual. Bradner, Diebalk,
and Schuberth (1998) argue that this method has several advantages.
The H-P filter is relatively judgment free since only one parameter,43
namely the length of the business cycle, has to be fixed. As a direct
method, it is able to exclude transitory non-cyclical events. The linearity
of the H-P filter also facilitates using a disaggregated approach since the
disaggregated structural components add to 1. This method is also not
very demanding in terms of data requirements. One disadvantage
however, is that it cannot capture the impact of fiscal policy changes if
these are located at the end-points of the sample.
Trends in Structural and Cyclical Deficits
In this analysis, a distinction is made between structural fiscal
deficit and structural primary deficit by calculating the trend ratios of
primary expenditure (pes) and interest payments relative to GDP ips
separately. Thus,
fs= (pe) s-rs+(ip) s and fc= f-fs (26)
Thus, f = ps + (ip)s + fc where ps = (pe)s – rs (27)
The fiscal deficit to GDP ratio thus has three components:
primary structural deficit, structural interest payments relative to GDP,
and cyclical fiscal deficit. Table 6 shows the structural and actual fiscal
deficits since 1990-91. Clearly, structural fiscal deficits account for a
large part of actual fiscal deficit in the nineties. The corresponding
estimates for the years since 1951-52 are given in table A2. Structural
interest payments to GDP ratio has increased continuously from 4.3
percent in 1990-91 to 5.9 percent in 2001-02, amounting to an increase
of 2.6 percentage points. Structural primary deficit can be seen to have
fallen from the peak of 4.14 percent in 1990-91 to 2.75 percent in 1997-
98, before it started rising again. Although both factors have contributed
to structural fiscal deficit, the impact of structural interest payments has
been larger in the nineties and also more persistent.44
Table 6: Combined Central and State Finances: Structural and 
Cyclical Deficits Relative to GDP
 
































1990-91 9.383 8.433 0.950 4.144 4.4757 4.397 4.288
1991-92 7.162 8.302 -1.140 3.822 3.2284 4.746 4.480
1992-93 7.240 8.171 -0.931 3.516 2.9542 4.792 4.656
1993-94 9.824 8.059 1.765 3.243 2.8343 4.953 4.816
1994-95 6.945 7.975 -1.030 3.012 4.3319 5.128 4.963
1995-96 6.778 7.947 -1.169 2.846 3.8711 4.962 5.101
1996-97 6.081 7.993 -1.912 2.757 2.5044 5.111 5.236
1997-98 7.660 8.118 -0.459 2.748 0.5467 5.159 5.370
1998-99 8.227 8.309 -0.083 2.801 1.9892 5.318 5.508
1999-00 9.002 8.548 0.453 2.899 0.3002 5.682 5.650
2000-01 8.792 8.816 -0.024 3.022 -1.1835 5.727 5.794
2001-02 10.557 9.099 1.458 3.159 -0.4902 6.098 5.939
Source (basic data): Indian Public Finance Statistics and National Income Accounts.
Structural Primary Gap
The structural ‘primary gap’ is defined as the difference between
actual structural primary deficit and the debt-stabilising primary deficit
(p
s) defined as {bt-1*(1+gt)/(gt-it)}. Table 6 also shows that the primary
deficit has been higher than the ‘debt-stabilising’ primary deficit, in most
of the years in the nineties except 1990-91, 1994-95, and 1995-96. The
structural primary balance has been used in the literature to assess the
medium-term fiscal stance. The large values of the structural primary
balance since the late nineties clearly indicate that the current medium-
term fiscal stance is not sustainable.
The profile of structural and debt-stabilising primary deficit is
compared in chart 4 since 1951-52. The structural primary deficit is
shown by the bolder line. There are long stretches towards the end of the
eighties and the latter part of the nineties that the structural primary45
deficit has been much higher than the debt-stabilising primary deficit.
These are the episodes in time where large accretion of debt relative to
GDP took place. This led to larger structural interest payments relative to
GDP. Together, structural primary deficit and structural interest
payments have caused structural fiscal deficits to be large.
Chart 4: Comparison of Structural and Debt-Stabilizing Primary
Deficit
In view of the large structural fiscal deficit, the role that cyclical 
Chart 4: Comparison of Structural and Debt-Stablising 
Primary Deficit
In view of the large structural fiscal deficit, the role that cyclical
deficit can play has become extremely limited in periods of recession.
Table A3 shows estimates of cyclical deficit against the difference
between actual growth rate and trend growth rate. It is expected that a
suitable short-term fiscal stance would show opposite signs between
cyclical deficit and departures of actual growth from trend growth, that is,
when actual growth is below trend, the cyclical deficit should be positive
and vice versa. It would be seen that throughout the period from 1965-66
to 1987-88, the short-term stance was in the correct direction. It is in the
period since 1988-89 that the short-term stance has not been robust
except in the mid-nineties.46
Policy Options
In considering the policy options for India at the current juncture,
it may be noted that the debt-GDP ratio, according to available
information, is estimated to be in excess of 80 percent of GDP at the end
of 2004-05. This includes reserve funds and deposits for both the centre
and states but external debt is evaluated at historical exchange rates.
Also, liabilities of the market stabilisation fund are not included against
which an equivalent asset in the form of cash reserves is held with the
RBI. Ruling out any further increase in the debt-GDP as undesirable, the
policy option is whether to stabilise the debt-GDP ratio at its present level
or bring it down before stabilising. From the viewpoint of a suitable
medium-term fiscal policy stance, a combination of high fiscal deficit,
high debt, and high-interest payments relative to-GDP will negatively
impact on the trend-growth rate by keeping the saving-GDP ratio below
its potential. By reducing the debt-GDP ratio, interest payments relative
to GDP will also be reduced such that, in combination with feasible levels
of revenue receipts relative to GDP, government will be able to balance
its revenue account and eliminate dissaving. Such a fiscal stance would
facilitate achieving a higher level of growth rate on a sustained basis.
This calls for a period of adjustment during which fiscal deficit is lowered
each year from the previous year’s level such that, in each successive
year, the debt-GDP ratio falls. This adjustment phase may continue until
revenue deficit is eliminated. Thereafter, a stabilisation phase can
emerge when the fiscal deficit may remain constant at a level leading
eventually also to debt-stabilisation.
The FRBMA enacted by the central government, read with its
rules and subsequent amendment, specifies the target for achieving a
fiscal deficit to GDP ratio of 3 percent by 2008-09. The FRBMA, as it
stands at present, is incomplete in two respects. First, it does not define
a debt-GDP ratio that would be required for keeping the economy on its
potential growth path, and secondly, it does not define suitable limits of
departure from the medium-term stance to cope with cyclical fluctuations.
The prescription under the FRBMA can be evaluated in relation to the
Maastricht Treaty norms read with the Growth and Stability Pact. In the
European context, countries are supposed to maintain balance (zero
fiscal deficit) under normal circumstances and up to 3 percent fiscal
deficit, when faced with a downturn. Undoubtedly, the higher growth rate
in India will allow a higher level of fiscal deficit relative to GDP to be
maintained. A combined fiscal deficit of 6 percent of GDP for the47
government sector would be consistent with the available supply of funds
in the form of financial savings of the household sector of the order of
about 10-11 percent of GDP and feasible levels of current account deficit
of about 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP. This order of supply of funds would be
adequate for meeting the demand for these funds from the private
corporate sector to an extent of about 4-5 percent of GDP, demand from
the government sector (administrative departments and departmental
enterprises) of 6 percent of GDP (fiscal deficit) and that from the non-
departmental public enterprises of about 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP.  Thus,
a combined fiscal deficit of 6 percent of GDP is consistent with the
existing ratio of the savings of the household sector in financial assets
relative to GDP and prudent levels of current account deficit, and the
demand on these by the private corporate sector and non-departmental
public enterprises.
The FRBMA of the central government has indicated the need to
contain the fiscal deficit of the centre to 3 percent of GDP by 2008-09. In
determining a limit for the states considered together, it might be
recognised that the states have a higher share in the combined revenue
receipts after transfers, and therefore, in the context of sustainability,
they may be allowed a higher limit of fiscal deficit relative to GDP. But
the states also face a higher interest rate on average. If these two factors
roughly neutralise each other, allowing a target limit of fiscal deficit
relative to GDP for the states similar to that for the centre, it would result
in a ratio of interest payments to revenue receipts for the states similar to
that for the centre
8. Thus, fiscal deficit may be stabilised at 6 percent of
GDP on the combined account of the central and state governments with
3 percent each on their separate accounts, assuming that these levels of
fiscal deficits relate to the ‘own’ requirements of the two levels of
government. This should be considered as the relevant target over a
cycle. The Twelfth Finance Commission in the suggested programme for
restructuring public finances has recommended the target of reaching a
combined fiscal deficit of 6 percent of GDP by 2008-09. Among important
observers of the fiscal scene in India, Chelliah (2001, 2004) has argued
for this level of combined fiscal deficit. In a recent analysis of debt
sustainability, Ram Mohan, Dholakia, and Karan (2005), while dealing
with central debt, highlight a number of measurement issues. In their
adjustment programme, two scenarios are drawn with alternative
assumptions. In both cases, the central fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is
brought down to 3.9 percent by 2009-10. This is under the assumption of
the system of on-lending from the central to state governments being48
continued. About 0.8 percentage points of central fiscal deficit may only
be for on-lending to the states. Thus, for central fiscal deficit,
representing borrowing only for  ‘own’ needs, the target level after
adjustment that is considered feasible in their analysis does not appear
to be much different from the one suggested here, although there are
differences in the initial levels. 
 
As already mentioned, before the stabilisation phase is reached,
the Indian economy will have to pass through an adjustment phase.
During this phase, the debt-GDP ratio will have to fall. This can be done
by reducing the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio each year to a level lower than
that, which will stabilise the debt-GDP ratio at the previous year’s level.
For example, if the previous year’s debt-GDP ratio is 80 percent, and the
nominal growth rate is 12 percent, a fiscal deficit to GDP ratio of about
8.57 percent would leave it unchanged at 80 percent at the end of the
current year. A fiscal deficit that is below this level would lead to a
reduction in the debt-GDP ratio. The period of the adjustment phase will
be shorter, the larger the extent by which the actual fiscal deficit relative
to GDP is lower than the debt-stabilising level, and the faster the
improvement in the revenue to GDP ratio on the combined account of
central and state governments. Once the adjustment phase is over, and
the combined fiscal deficit of the centre and the states remains fixed at 6
percent, the debt-GDP ratio would still keep falling and eventually
stabilise at 56 percent of GDP
9. This is under the assumption that the
nominal growth rate would be 12 percent. At that stage, the interest
payments to revenue receipts ratio will stabilise at 17 percent
10 . This
ratio would be most desirable as it would permit a larger primary revenue
expenditure to be incurred on the social sectors. In fact, this will be
happening as the ratio of interest payments to revenue receipts begins to
fall from its present level of around 34 percent. The decomposition of this
overall interest payment to revenue receipts ratio between the centre and
the states will depend on their revenue receipts to GDP ratios and their
respective average interest rates. Maintaining balance on revenue
account will be facilitated as interest payment to GDP ratio falls. Under
these circumstances, the government can maintain a capital expenditure
to GDP ratio reasonably above 6 percent with some positive non-debt
capital receipts. In the medium term, a strategy of fiscal correction
broadly on these lines would support growth on a sustained basis as
government dissavings are reduced and government capital expenditure,
focused on infrastructure, is increased and kept above the level of 649
percent of GDP. The behaviour of the debt-GDP ratio under the
proposed reform scenario is given in chart 5 and appendix table A4. 
Chart 5: Debt and Fiscal Deficit to GDP Ratios under 
the Reform Scenario
Note: Debt-GDP ratio (b) is shown on the left hand vertical axis and fiscal deficit
to GDP ratio (fa) is shown on the right hand vertical axis with a different scale.
An argument is sometimes advanced that in the current
economic scenario, higher fiscal deficits should be used for
accommodating higher expenditure on infrastructure and social sectors.
While an increase in expenditures in some of these areas may be
desirable and even necessary, they ought to be undertaken in such a
way that there is no increase in primary deficit and debt-GDP ratio.
Expenditure prioritisation is thus requisite under such a situation. In fact,
as a result of expanding expenditures, government dissaving increases,
a sustained increase in the growth rate cannot emerge. With high levels
of revenue deficit, increased levels of expenditures on infrastructure and
social sectors cannot also be sustained. As demand for funds from the
private corporate sector increases, it cannot be assumed that the cost of
funds will remain benign, if government dis-savings do not come down.
An appropriate medium term strategy is to control fiscal deficit, reduce








































be reduced and government dissavings can be eliminated. This will
augment the overall saving rate. With stable costs of borrowing, overall
investment will increase to sustain a growth rate of 7 percent and above.
With the ratio of revenue deficit to GDP coming down progressively to
zero, the entire amount of borrowing supplemented by non-debt capital
receipts can be used for capital investment by the government.  The right
time for the adjustment phase is at present when the economy is on the
upswing.
VIII. Concluding Observations
This paper has looked at the impact of fiscal deficits on saving,
investment, and growth in the light of the theoretical literature on the
subject in the context of the fiscal deficit and debt on the combined
accounts of the central and state governments. Revenue deficits amount
to reduction in government savings, which may not be fully offset by a
corresponding rise in the private savings, leading to a fall in the overall
saving rate. The impact of fiscal deficit on investment arises both from its
impact on private investment and government investment. The adverse
effects on private investment occur if fiscal deficits put pressure on
interest rates, and if private investment is sensitive to the interest rate.
The effect on government capital expenditure is through committed
interest payments, which rise if the debt-GDP ratio rises and/or interest
rate rises. In the context of debt accumulation in India, the main findings
are summarised below.
•  Fiscal deficit and government debt in India, have received growing
attention of analysts and policymakers, particularly since the
nineties, when in most years the combined fiscal deficit was higher
than 9 percent of GDP. The concerns have become more serious in
recent years when there has been an explosive rise in the debt-GDP
ratio in spite of the fact that the nominal interest rates have fallen.
This is because, during 2000-03, nominal growth rates fell even
more. With growth rate being less than the effective interest rate, the
debt-GDP ratio increased both because of cumulated primary deficits
and excess of interest rate over growth rate during 2000-01 to 2002-
03.51
•  Even if fiscal deficits may appear to be sustainable according to
some studies, the critical issue relates to determining appropriate
levels of debt and deficit relative to GDP on which these should be
stabilised. This can be done by developing rules with given growth
and interest rates and initial debt levels. However, since fiscal
deficits and debt affect growth and interest rates, answers need to be
derived using information on their impact on savings and investment,
which ultimately determine the growth rate. The interest rates are
also affected by the fiscal deficit and monetary policy, but there may
also be exogenous influences, particularly international interest rates
and inflow of foreign capital.
•  When fiscal deficits are high in magnitude relative to GDP and
largely structural in nature, government’s ability to mount counter-
cyclical interventions could be compromised, particularly when
growth is below trend levels and intervention is needed. This was
clearly experienced in the late nineties and the early part of the new
decade.
•  In India, the household sector saves more than it invests, and the
excess becomes available in the form of financial savings of this
sector to the private corporate sector and the government sector for
their investment requirements that are not financed by their own
savings. Although government dissavings increased since the late
nineties, the pressure on interest rates was not witnessed because
of a fall in investment demand by the private corporate sector. This
may prove to be temporary. 
•  The overall growth rate depends on the overall savings rate and
investment rate. There is reason to believe that when government
saving falls, private saving rate increases as wealth held in the
private sector in the form of government bonds increases. This
compensatory rise in the private sector saving rate has been partial.
On the investment side, government’s own investment demand also
fell as its debt-GDP ratio and the ratio of interest payments to
revenue receipts rose. Empirical tests indicate that government
capital expenditures do respond negatively to the interest payments
and positively to revenue receipts. If interest payments rise faster
than revenue receipts, government capital expenditure falls. Private
investment responds negatively to a rise in expected interest rates.
In the nineties and beyond, government capital expenditures relative
to GDP fell not only because interest payments relative to GDP
increased but also because ratio of revenue receipts to GDP fell.52
•  The FRBMA has certain positive features. It is incomplete in two
respects. One, it does not indicate a suitable level of debt-GDP ratio
along with the specified fiscal deficit target, and secondly, it does not
provide for a suitable strategy for coping with short-term fluctuations.
•  It is important that centre’s FRBMA is supplemented by state level
fiscal responsibility legislations because, taken together, states’
borrowing and debt contribute significantly to the overall fiscal deficit
and debt relative to GDP and have significant macro implications.
•  To achieve and sustain growth at high levels, it is required that the
overall savings ratio is increased leading to a rise in the investment
ratio, and revenue and fiscal deficits should be so managed as to
serve this purpose. In the context of the present policy options, there
is a need to bring down the debt-GDP ratio from its present level,
which is in excess of 80 percent of GDP. The process of adjustment
can be considered in two phases: adjustment phase and stabilisation
phase. In the adjustment phase, fiscal deficit will have to be reduced
in each successive year to a level, which is less than the level of
fiscal deficit relative to GDP that will stabilise the debt-GDP ratio at
its previous year’s level. This phase should be continued until the
revenue deficit is eliminated. In the second phase, the fiscal deficit
could be stabilised at 6 percent of GDP. In this phase, the debt-GDP
ratio would fall for some more years and eventually stabilise at 56
percent. At this level of debt-GDP ratio, it is estimated that the
interest payment to revenue receipts ratio, under given assumptions,
would fall to 17 percent. As the ratio of interest payments to revenue
receipts begins to fall, it will enable a progressively larger amount of
primary revenue expenditure to be incurred on the social sectors. 54
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Table A1: Savings and Investment Relative to GDP at Market Prices
                          (percent to GDP)




















SH SPC SPVT SPUB S IPUB IPVT ISUM IADJ
1950-51 6.16 0.94 7.10 1.83 8.93 2.78 7.73 10.51 8.72
1951-52 5.52 1.29 6.80 2.52 9.32 3.04 7.81 10.85 11.05
1952-53 6.15 0.62 6.76 1.54 8.31 2.64 6.20 8.85 7.98
1953-54 5.81 0.80 6.60 1.27 7.87 2.76 4.63 7.38 7.76
1954-55 6.73 1.11 7.84 1.57 9.41 4.47 5.49 9.96 9.56
1955-56 9.62 1.23 10.85 1.75 12.60 4.80 7.72 12.52 12.96
1956-57 9.10 1.20 10.29 1.94 12.23 5.34 9.19 14.52 15.01
1957-58 7.47 0.91 8.38 1.99 10.37 6.43 8.24 14.68 13.91
1958-59 6.83 0.94 7.77 1.69 9.46 5.67 6.02 11.70 11.99
1959-60 8.30 1.18 9.48 1.67 11.15 5.95 7.47 13.42 12.63
1960-61 7.30 1.64 8.94 2.64 11.59 6.86 7.79 14.66 14.39
1961-62 7.04 1.76 8.80 2.89 11.69 6.52 8.44 14.96 13.59
1962-63 7.84 1.76 9.59 3.08 12.67 7.62 8.04 15.65 14.92
1963-64 7.20 1.75 8.95 3.34 12.29 7.71 7.76 15.47 14.25
1964-65 7.15 1.48 8.63 3.30 11.93 7.65 7.88 15.54 14.22
1965-66 9.40 1.46 10.87 3.12 13.99 8.25 8.08 16.33 16.15
1966-67 10.30 1.35 11.65 2.33 13.98 7.06 9.53 16.59 16.92
1967-68 8.76 1.12 9.88 2.01 11.88 6.59 8.64 15.23 14.17
1968-69 8.63 1.13 9.76 2.40 12.16 5.82 8.56 14.38 13.23
1969-70 10.39 1.28 11.67 2.61 14.28 5.52 9.82 15.34 14.84
1970-71 10.15 1.47 11.62 2.94 14.56 6.39 9.43 15.82 15.42
1971-72 10.67 1.57 12.24 2.82 15.06 6.98 9.95 16.93 16.03
1972-73 10.43 1.49 11.92 2.67 14.59 7.18 8.98 16.17 15.1461
Table A1: Savings and Investment Relative to GDP at Market Prices (contd.)
                          (percent to GDP)




















SH SPC SPVT SPUB S IPUB IPVT ISUM IADJ
1973-74 12.17 1.65 13.82 2.94 16.76 7.47 9.18 16.66 17.36
1974-75 10.43 1.89 12.32 3.66 15.98 7.43 10.89 18.32 16.82
1975-76 11.70 1.30 13.00 4.23 17.23 9.37 9.60 18.97 17.09
1976-77 13.20 1.32 14.52 4.88 19.40 9.83 9.27 19.10 17.94
1977-78 14.13 1.39 15.52 4.31 19.83 7.97 10.71 18.68 18.38
1978-79 15.45 1.50 16.95 4.55 21.50 9.23 11.48 20.71 21.61
1979-80 13.81 1.98 15.80 4.32 20.12 10.04 11.33 21.37 20.60
1980-81 13.82 1.63 15.45 3.43 18.88 8.42 10.27 18.69 20.33
1981-82 12.59 1.52 14.11 4.49 18.60 10.07 12.34 22.41 20.15
1982-83 12.33 1.58 13.91 4.34 18.26 10.70 10.97 21.66 19.62
1983-84 12.83 1.48 14.31 3.27 17.58 9.69 9.99 19.68 18.73
1984-85 14.28 1.65 15.93 2.83 18.76 10.43 11.17 21.60 20.10
1985-86 14.32 1.95 16.27 3.22 19.49 10.79 12.88 23.67 21.73
1986-87 14.48 1.71 16.20 2.75 18.94 11.17 12.03 23.20 20.99
1987-88 16.69 1.67 18.37 2.21 20.58 9.53 12.59 22.11 22.50
1988-89 16.76 2.01 18.77 2.08 20.85 9.52 14.17 23.69 23.77
1989-90 17.89 2.44 20.32 1.68 22.00 9.54 14.12 23.66 24.53
1990-91 19.33 2.67 21.99 1.10 23.10 9.34 14.73 24.07 26.30
1991-92 16.96 3.11 20.06 1.97 22.03 8.82 13.11 21.93 22.55
1992-93 17.51 2.67 20.18 1.59 21.77 8.55 15.24 23.79 23.61
1993-94 18.42 3.48 21.90 0.63 22.53 8.24 13.01 21.25 23.09
1994-95 19.68 3.48 23.17 1.66 24.83 8.71 14.67 23.38 26.00
1995-96 18.19 4.93 23.12 2.03 25.15 7.66 18.87 26.53 26.9062
Table A1: Savings and Investment Relative to GDP at Market Prices (contd.)
                          (percent to GDP)




















SH SPC SPVT SPUB S IPUB IPVT ISUM IADJ
1996-97 17.05 4.47 21.51 1.67 23.19 7.03 14.74 21.77 24.48
1997-98 17.63 4.17 21.80 1.33 23.13 6.61 15.96 22.57 24.60
1998-99 18.77 3.74 22.51 -0.99 21.52 6.58 14.80 21.38 22.57
1999-00 20.88 4.35 25.23 -1.04 24.20 6.94 16.72 23.66 25.33
2000-01 21.93 4.12 26.05 -2.31 23.74 6.29 16.33 22.62 24.35
2001-02 22.74 3.46 26.20 -2.75 23.45 5.83 16.48 22.31 23.13
2002-03 22.65 3.41 26.05 -1.85 24.20 5.68 17.15 22.83 23.28
  Source: National Income Accounts, CSO.
Table A2: Combined Central and State Finances: Structural and Cyclical Deficits



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1951-52 1.121 0.850 0.271 0.160 1.1299 0.644 0.690 -0.969
1952-53 0.639 1.371 -0.733 0.614 -1.283 0.724 0.757 1.896
1953-54 0.701 1.896 -1.195 1.071 1.714 0.736 0.825 -0.643
1954-55 2.582 2.418 0.164 1.527 -2.647 1.040 0.891 4.175
1955-56 2.771 2.922 -0.151 1.968 -0.556 1.140 0.954 2.524
1956-57 2.928 3.393 -0.465 2.379 4.626 0.957 1.014 -2.24763
Table A2: Combined Central and State Finances: Structural and Cyclical Deficits (contd.)



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1957-58 4.913 3.813 1.099 2.741 -0.031 0.989 1.072 2.772
1958-59 6.312 4.163 2.149 3.033 2.713 0.988 1.130 0.320
1959-60 5.785 4.432 1.353 3.244 0.836 1.142 1.188 2.408
1960-61 3.506 4.631 -1.125 3.387 2.425 1.270 1.245 0.961
1961-62 2.928 4.786 -1.858 3.487 1.053 1.341 1.298 2.435
1962-63 3.987 4.909 -0.923 3.562 1.534 1.467 1.348 2.027
1963-64 4.862 4.997 -0.135 3.605 4.339 1.348 1.392 -0.734
1964-65 5.723 5.035 0.689 3.604 4.783 1.350 1.431 -1.180
1965-66 5.658 5.007 0.652 3.542 0.705 1.525 1.465 2.837
1966-67 9.705 4.904 4.801 3.412 3.672 1.677 1.493 -0.260
1967-68 4.529 4.726 -0.197 3.212 5.790 1.558 1.514 -2.578
1968-69 3.251 4.517 -1.267 2.987 1.114 1.551 1.530 1.874
1969-70 2.648 4.322 -1.674 2.779 2.894 1.530 1.543 -0.115
1970-71 2.380 4.172 -1.792 2.617 1.337 1.635 1.555 1.280
1971-72 6.816 4.081 2.734 2.514 1.346 1.700 1.567 1.168
1972-73 4.126 4.047 0.079 2.463 3.006 1.602 1.583 -0.542
1973-74 1.100 4.092 -2.992 2.485 7.195 1.532 1.607 -4.710
1974-75 3.037 4.242 -1.205 2.599 4.841 1.508 1.643 -2.242
1975-76 2.090 4.492 -2.403 2.798 1.258 1.394 1.694 1.540
1976-77 7.361 4.824 2.537 3.061 0.762 1.948 1.763 2.299
1977-78 7.118 5.198 1.921 3.348 3.206 1.723 1.849 0.142
1978-79 3.312 5.596 -2.284 3.643 1.453 1.990 1.953 2.19064
Table A2: Combined Central and State Finances: Structural and Cyclical Deficits (contd.)



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1979-80 6.086 6.023 0.062 3.949 1.713 2.212 2.075 2.236
1980-81 7.372 6.459 0.912 4.246 5.342 2.065 2.214 -1.096
1981-82 5.983 6.886 -0.903 4.514 4.611 2.228 2.372 -0.097
1982-83 9.177 7.293 1.884 4.743 2.295 2.464 2.550 2.448
1983-84 5.389 7.661 -2.272 4.916 4.581 2.531 2.745 0.335
1984-85 8.551 7.991 0.560 5.035 2.189 2.925 2.956 2.846
1985-86 8.995 8.261 0.734 5.082 2.895 3.144 3.179 2.187
1986-87 10.123 8.452 1.671 5.045 2.385 3.443 3.407 2.660
1987-88 9.010 8.556 0.454 4.918 3.514 3.666 3.637 1.404
1988-89 9.089 8.578 0.510 4.715 5.790 3.901 3.863 -1.075
1989-90 8.991 8.532 0.459 4.450 3.780 4.217 4.082 0.670
1990-91 9.383 8.433 0.950 4.144 4.476 4.397 4.288 -0.331
1991-92 7.162 8.302 -1.140 3.822 3.228 4.746 4.480 0.594
1992-93 7.240 8.171 -0.931 3.516 2.954 4.792 4.656 0.561
1993-94 9.824 8.059 1.765 3.243 2.834 4.953 4.816 0.408
1994-95 6.945 7.975 -1.030 3.012 4.332 5.128 4.963 -1.320
1995-96 6.778 7.947 -1.169 2.846 3.871 4.962 5.101 -1.025
1996-97 6.081 7.993 -1.912 2.757 2.504 5.111 5.236 0.253
1997-98 7.660 8.118 -0.459 2.748 0.547 5.159 5.370 2.201
1998-99 8.227 8.309 -0.083 2.801 1.989 5.318 5.508 0.812
1999-00 9.002 8.548 0.453 2.899 0.300 5.682 5.650 2.598
2000-01 8.792 8.816 -0.024 3.022 -1.184 5.727 5.794 4.206
2001-02 10.557 9.099 1.458 3.159 -0.490 6.098 5.939 3.649
Source (Basic data): Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance and National Income Accounts, CSO.65
Table A3: Consistency of Short-Run Fiscal Stance

























1951-52 0.271 2.334 4.445 -2.110 Y
1952-53 -0.733 2.838 4.277 -1.439
1953-54 -1.195 6.087 4.144 1.943 Y
1954-55 0.164 4.245 4.029 0.216
1955-56 -0.151 2.562 3.937 -1.375
1956-57 -0.465 5.692 3.871 1.821 Y
1957-58 1.099 -1.209 3.825 -5.034 Y
1958-59 2.149 7.589 3.806 3.783
1959-60 1.353 2.188 3.776 -1.588 Y
1960-61 -1.125 7.080 3.735 3.345 Y
1961-62 -1.858 3.103 3.668 -0.565
1962-63 -0.923 2.115 3.594 -1.479
1963-64 -0.135 5.063 3.522 1.540 Y
1964-65 0.689 7.584 3.449 4.135
1965-66 0.652 -3.655 3.382 -7.037 Y
1966-67 4.801 1.017 3.371 -2.354 Y
1967-68 -0.197 8.138 3.388 4.750 Y
1968-69 -1.267 2.609 3.386 -0.777
1969-70 -1.674 6.517 3.369 3.148 Y
1970-71 -1.792 5.013 3.331 1.682 Y
1971-72 2.734 1.010 3.297 -2.288 Y
1972-73 0.079 -0.318 3.305 -3.624 Y
1973-74 -2.992 4.552 3.366 1.185 Y
1974-75 -1.205 1.161 3.455 -2.294
1975-76 -2.403 9.004 3.559 5.445 Y
1976-77 2.537 1.250 3.647 -2.397 Y
1977-78 1.921 7.470 3.741 3.729
1978-79 -2.284 5.503 3.836 1.667 Y
1979-80 0.062 -5.202 3.963 -9.164 Y
1980-81 0.912 7.170 4.164 3.006
1981-82 -0.903 5.969 4.386 1.584 Y
1982-83 1.884 3.060 4.606 -1.547 Y
1983-84 -2.272 7.684 4.822 2.862 Y
1984-85 0.560 4.311 5.016 -0.705 Y
1985-86 0.734 4.453 5.199 -0.746 Y66
Table A3: Consistency of Short-Run Fiscal Stance (contd.)

























1986-87 1.671 4.332 5.375 -1.043 Y
1987-88 0.454 3.827 5.539 -1.712 Y
1988-89 0.510 10.475 5.679 4.796
1989-90 0.459 6.703 5.769 0.934
1990-91 0.950 5.567 5.833 -0.266 Y
1991-92 -1.140 1.298 5.898 -4.600
1992-93 -0.931 5.119 5.982 -0.863
1993-94 1.765 5.903 6.059 -0.156 Y
1994-95 -1.030 7.255 6.100 1.155 Y
1995-96 -1.169 7.342 6.082 1.261 Y
1996-97 -1.912 7.839 5.996 1.844 Y
1997-98 -0.459 4.795 5.849 -1.054
1998-99 -0.083 6.507 5.663 0.844 Y
1999-00 0.453 6.061 5.446 0.615
2000-01 -0.024 4.374 5.211 -0.838
2001-02 1.458 5.777 4.975 0.801
    Source (Basic Data): National Income Accounts, CSO, and Indian Public Finance
     Statistics.
Table A4: Debt and Fiscal Deficit Relative to GDP  
Under Reforms
( percent)









Table A4: Debt and Fiscal Deficit Relative to GDP  
Under Reforms (contd.)
( percent)































Source: based on estimation 52
End Notes
                                                
1  To an extent, monetisation of fiscal deficits can help reduce the cost of
servicing debt in terms of the interest payments directly or indirectly.
The direct impact obtains when the government borrows from the
central bank at less than market or sometimes zero interest rates. The
indirect impact obtains when the government borrows from the Central
bank at comparable interest costs but gets higher dividends from the
Central bank, thereby reducing the effective cost of borrowing. At a
theoretical level, the benefit of expansion in money supply through
seigniorage is limited by the increase in money supply that is justifiable,
taking into account the need for maintaining reasonable price stability.
Any rise in prices fuelled by excessive increase in money supply may
worsen the budgetary gap, if revenues respond less than expenditures
to increase in prices. In the present Indian conditions, nominal interest
rates are low because of excess liquidity conditions due to the
expansion of reserve money based on the accretion of foreign
exchange reserves. In fact, through stabilisation bonds, the government
is trying to suck liquidity. The benefit of low interest rates is available to
the government and others. Any additional expansion of money supply
could lower nominal and real interest rates further and adversely affect
private sector savings. Any build-up of inflationary expectations would
also adversely affect growth.
2 Sometimes this equation is defined with an explicit term for the ratio of
seigniorage to GDP. Seigniorage can be obtained in many forms. It may
be explicit in the form of printed money. It may be implicit if the
government is able to borrow with the help of the central bank at
administered rates, which are less than what the market would
determine otherwise. Seigniorage also arises if the government borrows
from the central bank at non-zero interest rates, but gets dividends from
the central bank on such earnings.
3  It can be shown that
δf*/δg  = -p.i/(g-i)
2
Similarly, δd*/δg = -p.(1+i)/(g-i)
2
The effect of an increase in the growth rate, given the interest rate and
holding other variables unchanged, is to lower the equilibrium levels of
fiscal deficit and debt.
4 For a discussion on the issue of optimality also see Rakshit (2005).
5  According to the Pact for Stability and Growth (PSG), in the medium
term, the net deficit or the net borrowing to GDP ratio should be “close
to balance or in net surplus”. However, the net deficit may exceed 3
percent of GDP under exceptional or temporary circumstances. The53
                                                                                                            
PSG acknowledges the need to distinguish between cyclical and
structural components of budget balance. In any case, the three-
percent reference value should not be exceeded during normal
economic downturns.
6 An economic downturn is considered exceptional if there is an annual
fall of real GDP of at least 2 percent. A severe recession is defined as a
downturn with a negative annual real GDP growth of 0.75 percent or
more.
7  The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a two-sided linear filter. It is widely used to
obtain estimates of the trend component of a long series. This filter
computes the smoothed series s of y by minimising the variance of y
around s, subject to the penalty that constrains the second difference of
s. s is chosen so as to minimise, the following expression:
Σ(yt-st)
2  (t varies from 1,2,…,T)
+ λΣ{(st+1-st)
 -(st-st-1)}
2  (t varies from 2 to T-1)
The penalty parameter λ is set so as to control the smoothness of the
derived series s. For annual series, the recommended value of λ is 100.
As λ approaches infinity, s will approach  a straight line.
8 The ratio of interest payments to revenue receipts of the states will be
equal to or less than that for the centre as long as the ratio of states'
revenue receipts to the that of the centre equals or exceeds the ratio of
the average interest rate paid by the states to that paid by the centre,
after the fiscal deficit and debt-GDP ratios are equalised for the two
levels of the government.
9 This is derived on the assumption of a nominal growth rate of 12
percent using equation (10). 
10  This is based on the assumption of revenue receipts to GDP ratio of
about 21 percent.